Mr. Chair, thank you for the opportunity to address your committee today.

I would like to make a few remarks on Canada's Indo-Pacific strategy by first talking about the external environment that we now face and then make some observations about the strategy itself.

First of all, in my view, the IPS is probably the most significant, comprehensive and ambitious strategic document on the Indo-Pacific or Asia-Pacific region that the Canadian government has ever issued. It comes at a time when the rules-based international order is being increasingly challenged by China, Russia and other authoritarian regimes. Consequently, the link between economic security and national security has become increasingly critical to western nations, including Canada.

Canada has a huge stake in maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. In 2022, Canada's total trade with the region was $270 billion, or about 18% of Canada's total global trade. Much of this trade goes by maritime vessel, through contentious waters, the south and east China seas, so any disruptions in that area could have devastating consequences for Canada, and indeed the global economy.

As we all know, China is a significant trading partner of Canada, and at the same time a rival and a security threat to Canada and our allies. However, the Indo-Pacific strategy will not live or die based solely on Canada's relations with China. Canada's trade with China represented only about 8.5% of Canada's total trade in 2022, but the balance of trade is heavily in China's favour. Their exports to Canada—over $100 billion—are more than three times what they import from Canada. Given the realities we face with a rising China, it's in Canada's interest to be more pragmatic and transactional with China, while prioritizing and broadening our economic and security relations with allies like Japan and South Korea, as well as pursuing deeper economic ties with ASEAN nations and Taiwan.

While the IPS itself is quite comprehensive, it does have a few gaps and shortcomings, in my view. One issue where it appears that there's a gap is between Canada's commitment to multilateralism and the realities Canada is faced with in the world. A host of minilateral groupings have sprung up in the Indo-Pacific to address urgent and/or unique regional economic and security issues. While Canada is a member of the CPTPP, it has been left out of other fora, such as the Indo-Pacific economic framework and security partnerships, such as the Australia, U.K. and U.S. AUKUS partnership. A strategy to address Canada's participation in these and other minilaterals is not addressed in the IPS.

Also, while the strategy acknowledges that the north Pacific faces growing security challenges, there's no reference at all to Russia in the strategy. Russia is also an Indo-Pacific nation and a regional security concern, and poses threats to Canada in the longer term, especially in the Arctic.

With regard to trade, the Indo-Pacific strategy notably aims to position Canada as a responsible and reliable energy security partner, but it makes no mention of Canada's hydrocarbon resources, even though Canada is an environmentally responsible, world-scale producer. In fact, the first tanker carrying the Trans Mountain pipeline's first shipment of crude oil to Asia left Burnaby just last Wednesday. Next year should see LNG Canada's project come online.

Canada will then be in a position to help the region lower its coal emissions. The IPS emphasizes clean energy, which is fine, but hydrocarbons are in demand in the region now and likely will be for decades. All of Canada's energy resources should play a part in leveraging Canada's position in the region. In my view, this is a significant oversight.

Ultimately, the effectiveness and success of the IPS will depend on two things.

The first is how the U.S. views our commitment to the region, which is to say, are we prioritizing national security and defence as well as trade and economics? U.S. concerns with Canada's failure to meet our NATO commitments have been made all too clear in the past few days. Meeting our defence commitments at a time when threats are growing is essential to being taken seriously when it comes to being seen as a partner in the region and being invited to join regional fora.

The second key factor is Canada's ability to achieve the goals in the IPS. Much will depend on the strength of Canada's economy and the ability to actually execute on the strategy. Unfortunately, Canada's share of global exports is falling. Manufactured exports are stagnating, and our GDP is underperforming that of our peers.

Canada also needs to urgently address the inadequacies and supports for Canada's foreign service and the personnel-readiness and funding issues plaguing the military. Thus, there are real concerns about Canada's capacity to deliver over the longer term.

I don't want to leave you with the impression that I'm critical or pessimistic. In fact, I'm quite the opposite. My main concern is with follow-through and with ensuring that the strategy is properly resourced and effectively implemented, as I believe its success is an essential component for Canada's long-term prosperity and security.

Thank you very much.