Thank you.

Good afternoon, Chair and committee members.

As a professor and Canada research chair at McGill University, I focus my work on AI, cybersecurity and social media analytics. I would like to express my concern about foreign interference in Canadian academic institutions.

I would like to begin by sharing a personal experience. Over the past few years, a prominent Chinese 5G enterprise, which I will refer to as “Company H,” has repeatedly approached me with various research collaboration proposals. They offered me a consulting position on their AI team with a salary that is three times my earning as a professor. Despite my rejecting their offers, they persistently contacted me every few years. Just last year, they explicitly expressed interest in my work on malware analysis. Let me emphasize this again: This company is specifically interested in computer viruses. Clearly, this raises national security concerns.

Another tactic they use is offering research contracts through external organizations owned by professors. This would bypass any university or government approval processes. I'm sure Company H is not the only foreign state-controlled organization operating under the guise of a Canadian company.

As a scientist, I really hope this bill can address this national security risk. I urge our government to disclose a list of organizations, or have some mechanism that allows universities to query which companies are controlled or influenced by foreign governments in Canada and pose a national security risk. This transparency will help Canadian researchers avoid compromising collaborations.

In 2024, the Canadian government released a list of named research organizations in three foreign countries. This is a commendable step towards safeguarding our scientific contributions. However, it is crucial to understand that research projects conducted in any Chinese university can be repurposed for military use. The determining factor is not the collaborating organization but the potential application of the technology itself. Therefore, the assessment should be conducted at the country level regarding the sensitivity of research topics.

The second concern I have is that Chinese consulates in Canada maintain close ties with many Chinese student associations in Canadian universities, as seen in their co-organized events. For instance, the first event of Chinese student orientation is often a meeting with the Chinese consulate, rather than the university administrators or professors. This arrangement sends a clear message to the international Chinese student: “Be compliant. Big Brother in China is watching you.” This pressure can lead students to disclose information about their research, schoolmates or professors to foreign governments. If this bill is passed, it is crucial for university administrations to inform international students of its provisions. This bill will empower students to confidently reject requests from foreign governments.

I'm supportive of the bill with the following amendments.

First, I suggest removing the administrative monetary penalty. Maybe I don't fully understand that part, but this punishment seems to be too weak.

Second, currently, the CCP government purchases airtime from Chinese radio stations in Canada to broadcast their propaganda. I wonder whether these Chinese media should be registered in Canada.

Third, I support the idea of having two-tier registrations like the U.K. model. This will allow the Canadian government to impose more accurate restrictions on selected entities.

Fourth, with the advancement of AI technology, foreign interference activities are expected to change rapidly, so a more frequent periodic review of this act may be needed.

Thank you very much.