Thank you, honourable members of Parliament. I appreciate the opportunity to share perspectives on the issue of Sudan and to elevate the voices of our Sudanese partners, who have suffered greatly and are desperate to be heard.

There is no greater expression of democratic self-determination than the popular overthrow of a dictator. That is what happened in Sudan in 2019, creating hope that Sudan would enter the democratic age. However, a tortured transition ensued, which ultimately resulted in a military coup in 2021 orchestrated by the same parties that plunged Sudan into civil war. The devastation caused by this war is further compounded by the lost opportunity for democratic transition that preceded it.

The speed and scale of Sudan's collapse are breathtaking. Sudan now has roughly 8.8 million people displaced and some 25 million requiring humanitarian assistance. Sudan is now the largest conflict displacement crisis in the world and one of the largest in recent history. As of May 24, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project has documented more than 17,000 direct conflict fatalities, with more than 30,000 injured, according to the IRC. These numbers are conservative and do not include deaths from starvation, injuries or disease, and likely undercount deaths from multiple large-scale massacres of civilians by the RSF and allied militias in Darfur. Even by these conservative numbers, the war in Sudan is the deadliest war on the African continent.

The war combines the worst elements of both conventional and unconventional warfare. The heavy use of weapons, including artillery, mortars, drones and air strikes, has caused major damage to populated areas and civilian infrastructure. At the same time, the large-scale mobilization of ethnic and religious forces has unleashed sectarian violence and rampant criminality on the civilian population.

A continued war poses significant risks to the region and, by extension, to U.S. and Canadian interests. Spillover of the conflict into neighbouring states is a growing possibility. The stability of the Red Sea, already in jeopardy, will be further threatened, and the risk of violent extremism is growing. Islamist militias are already mobilized and fighting with the SAF. These militias, with their own agendas and extremist ideology, are dangerous veto players that could derail a future peace process. Sudan checks the boxes of many of the factors empirically shown to increase risks of violent extremism.

With this backdrop, let me touch briefly on what IRI has been doing in Sudan.

At IRI, we are trying to set the conditions for Sudan such that the aspirations of the people are addressed through legitimate mechanisms. Since 2019, we have been working to strengthen civilian elements to participate in the transition process. IRI supported the establishment of women and youth political party platforms, where members from different political parties and former armed movements came together to discuss avenues for improving the inclusion of women and youth within internal party processes and as part of the political transition process.

With the Taqaddum coalition, we have been supporting members through training and advocacy and through assistance with scenario planning and negotiations. We also work with the resistance committees, which played a key role in the overthrow of al-Bashir in 2019, to provide the tools and strategies needed to organize and meaningfully engage in political processes and advocacy. In partnership with Internews, we have been supporting journalists and media houses to report on the war and human rights violations. We are grateful to have funding from USAID and the U.S. State Department to carry out these activities.

I note that these critically important civil society actors are facing significant threats both inside and outside Sudan. Many civil society stakeholders were prevented from leaving Sudan to attend the recent Taqaddum founding conference in Addis Ababa. Members of Taqaddum resistance committees and other civil society organizations were ruthlessly targeted by both SAF and RSF forces within Sudan. The international community must do more to protect these actors, both inside and outside Sudan.

Let me turn next to the issue of ceasefire and negotiations. A ceasefire is urgently needed. While the RSF has repeatedly agreed to a ceasefire in principle, the SAF has rebuffed calls for a ceasefire and vows to fight until victory. Belligerents are unlikely to reach a ceasefire unless both sides view the cost of fighting to be higher than the cost of a ceasefire.

The international community can increase punitive measures, including sanctions, against SAF and RSF leadership, international arms suppliers and key members of the SAF's governing coalition, including businesses and hardline religious groups that are members of the coalition. Civilian forces are rarely included in direct negotiations, yet we know historically that ceasefires in Africa that include a timeline for negotiations or advance a peace process are twice as likely to be durable compared to ceasefires that are delinked from substantive negotiations.