Good morning, Chair. Thank you so much for the invitation to contribute to this study.

My work in space security, space law and space governance spans Australia and North America. I'm particularly interested in what space middle powers can achieve, particularly when they collaborate together and also work with smaller blocs or blocs of smaller nations.

I'll focus on four things. The first is the implications of the commercialization of space; the second is how Canada can and, in fact, already does lead in bringing a gender lens to space security; the third is geopolitical impacts on space; and the fourth, if time allows, is why having a national space policy is essential. I know others have spoken to that.

Firstly, on the implications of the commercialization of space, we really need to think about space and space-based services a little bit all the time, a bit like the way we all think about cyber and cybersecurity a little all the time.

We're all conscious of how much cyberspace permeates our lives. We're all conscious that we need to have strong passwords and protect our personal information. We all understand the risks of cyber-attacks and the need for cybersecurity for national security.

That's how we need to think about space a little bit, as well, all the time. It's permeating. It's ubiquitous. These space-based services are a part of our daily personal lives and a part of our national economic well-being, as well as our national security. It's still fairly early in the morning. You've probably used space at least 10 times this morning, and by this evening, you probably will have used it 20 to 40 times. That's how permeating it is, so space defence is important because space is important to Canada.

I'm not sure if others have spoken to this, but I think it's useful to also understand that space systems are made up of four segments.

There's the space segment, obviously—the satellite or the spacecraft that's in space. There's the ground segment, which is satellite dishes, receivers and data processing. There's the link segment, which is the communication link between satellites and the ground segment that's providing data on the way that we operate the satellites. The link segment is actually the most vulnerable to threats and interferences. The fourth segment is the human segment, so that's you and I, as users of space, the operators of space and decision-makers.

It's quite useful when we talk about space defence to really understand that all of these systems matter to us on earth and that, in fact, three of those segments are not even in space.

Also, as others have already stated to this committee, it's important to understand the degree to which the majority of space services are dual-use. A single space system is providing the same services, such as communications and navigation, both for military uses and civilian uses. This is largely because of how commercialized space has become. There are approximately 10,000 operational satellites in orbit today. As 75% of those are commercially owned and only about 580 of them are dedicated military satellites, space as a service has become the modus operandi. DND, like many militaries around the world, is purchasing space services from commercial providers.

Last month, in Ottawa, I co-led a workshop that was funded by DND, which was delivered by a consulting company I work with called SSCL, or Space Strategies Consulting Limited. The workshop was titled “Defending and Protecting Commercial Space Systems in Times of Tension and Conflict”. We discussed the need for clear contractual terms when it comes to the protections that commercial space providers need to build into their own systems. We discussed the threats faced by commercial systems from adversaries and then, importantly, the implications on civilians when there's a loss of service because of those kinds of threats and interferences. There will be a report coming out early next year about that.

This leads to my second point, which is how Canada can lead in bringing a gender lens to space security. There's globally recognized evidence that girls and women suffer disproportionately during armed conflict for a range of reasons. Then, because of the dual-use nature of those commercial space services, if there's a loss of service because of an attack, that impacts not only the armed forces depending on them but also the civilians who depend on those same services. That often leads to disproportionate impacts for women and girls. One example is when Russia undertook a cyber-attack against a U.S. commercial Viasat satellite in 2022.

As well, earth observation capabilities and communications capabilities can be deployed in a positive way in fulfillment of Canada's obligations under the UN gender, women, peace and security agenda to protect women's and girls' rights during armed conflict. Canada's been very proactive in advocating for gender-neutral language in UN space security discussions and submissions on including a gender lens in space security. There's an opportunity for DND to advance this agenda explicitly in its space strategy as part of its standard operating procedures and also to partner with countries like the U.S. and Australia, who are very keen to advance that agenda.

My time is very short, so I'll speak very briefly to the third point.

Given that this study includes the impacts of advancements in space on Canada's sovereignty and national security, it's important to understand the geopolitical drivers behind those investments in space. I think, in its simplest terms, space is just another domain in which geopolitics are playing out. The tensions we see playing out regionally and globally are playing out in this technological domain as well, and this is exactly why space diplomacy is so important.

Canada has an international reputation of being an effective space diplomat. It works together with allies and partners, including smaller nations, to advance the agenda of responsible behaviours at UN discussions in Geneva and in New York. It was the first country to join the U.S. in committing not to test direct-ascent anti-satellite weapons, and it's also very much recognized for bringing clarity on the international law applicable to space security in those international discussions.

I will leave my final point on the need for national space policy. Suffice it to say that I join others in advocating for that.

Thank you.