Thank you very much, esteemed members of the committee.

My colleagues and I would like to thank the committee for the invitation to speak with you today regarding public safety of Canadians and foreign interference as it relates to the Government of India.

As this committee will understand, while we are here in full collaboration and ready to answer your questions, various obligations and statutes dictate what can be divulged to the committee owing to ongoing investigations, which limit what we can share. That is why we are not in a position to provide details on evidence.

However, we can share with you the rationale for concern for public safety, our attempts at co-operation with India, and how India’s refusal to co-operate led us to where we are today.

For context, law enforcement has been investigating extreme violence within communities and CSIS has been looking into India foreign interference for years.

As you are aware, on September 18 of last year the Prime Minister announced in the House of Commons that Canada had become aware of credible allegations, based on intelligence, of a potential link between the killing of a Canadian citizen in Canada and agents of the Government of India.

Since the Prime Minister's statement last year, the government's response has followed two separate tracks: law enforcement and diplomacy. The diplomatic track addresses our relations with the Government of India in many areas. The law enforcement track has focused on public safety and the application of the rule of law.

The public safety of Canadians has been the paramount consideration for all our actions when evaluating our relationship with India. We do understand and value all that India represents to Canada as an international partner, as well as our significant people-to-people ties. However, we cannot ignore the attempts by agents of the Government of India to engage in coercion and violence in Canada to undermine our democracy.

The RCMP has also sent resources to work directly with India's central counterterrorism law enforcement agency to allow for co-operation on violent extremism.

It is important for the public to understand what steps have been taken toward co-operation with India.

Throughout a series of meetings since August 2023, we have been clear that it is essential for our officials to maintain meaningful channels of communication and co-operation with India.

Specifically, we have had engagement between Canada’s national security and intelligence adviser, or NSIA—my predecessor or myself—and other senior officials from Global Affairs Canada, or GAC, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS, or the Privy Council Office, or PCO, and India’s national security adviser on six occasions: August and September 2023 in New Delhi, November 2023 in Dubai, December 2023 in Saudi Arabia, January 2024 in London and March 2024 in Dubai.

I also spoke to my counterpart in May 2024, when the RCMP made arrests in the Nijjar case. In addition, I spoke on several occasions to the then High Commissioner of India to Canada. The Prime Minister also discussed the matter with Prime Minister Modi at the G20 in New Delhi last year. The Indian government's response was to spread a false narrative that Canada showed it no evidence and that we were ignoring its concerns about Khalistani violent extremism.

After months of investigation and several updates, the RCMP approached the deputy minister of foreign affairs and me in late August of this year to present serious concerns for public safety and to explore all potential tools available to us to disable India's network in Canada. This unprecedented request from the RCMP during an ongoing investigation spoke to the seriousness of the risk posed to Canadians and people living in Canada. The evidence revealed the modus operandi used by India to target people living in Canada.

The Indian government's mode of operating starts with the collection of information on Canada-based individuals through diplomats and consular officials in Canada and through other individuals acting as proxies. Some of these individuals and businesses are coerced and threatened. This information is shared with senior levels of the Indian government, who then direct the commission of serious criminal activities against Indo-Canadians through the kinetic use of Lawrence Bishnoi's organized crime network. Bishnoi is currently in jail in India, and he is able to order these actions through his gang, which has extensive criminal networks in India and internationally. Serious crimes committed in Canada include homicides, assassination plots, perpetrated extortions and other extreme violence.

Given how alarming the evidence was, we knew we had to act and to act quickly. Our actions were driven by a pressing and serious concern for public safety. We needed the agents of the Indian government to stop their illegal activities in Canada, and we sought a collaborative approach with Indian officials.

We prepared ourselves for three scenarios for the Government of India’s possible reactions.

One, co-operative—India ceases its violent activities in Canada and demonstrates accountability.

Two, somewhat co-operative.

Three, unco-operative—no accountability and denial.

Our desired outcome to address the public safety concerns in Canada was without any doubt the co-operative scenario.

In October, the RCMP sought to meet their Indian counterpart on two occasions, unsuccessfully, in order to share evidence. First, the RCMP was scheduled to travel to India to meet with their law enforcement counterparts. Unfortunately, India used an administrative technicality to block this meeting from occurring. Second, the RCMP travelled to Washington on October 10. While an Indian officer confirmed a meeting, they never showed up.

To signal the seriousness of the matter, the RCMP deputy commissioner, the deputy minister of Foreign Affairs and I travelled to Singapore to meet with the Indian national security adviser on October 12. The deputy commissioner spoke about and demonstrated a body of evidence that established clear links between agents of the Government of India and violent criminal activities taking place in Canada.

We provided three options to the Indian national security adviser that would allow us to address public safety and accountability.

The first option was to waive immunity for the diplomats and consulate involved in the scheme, in order to allow the RCMP to question them.

The second option—the comprehensive option—was for India to take accountability and manage the violence by, first, stopping illegal activities in Canada, including directing Bishnoi to cease and desist; second, issuing a public statement to adopt a mechanism looking into the modus operandi within India, as they did with the U.S. case; third, recalling their diplomats involved in the scheme; and, fourth and finally, announcing a new India-Canada high-level dialogue on countering extremism.

If the first two options were refused, Canada would declare the diplomats personae non gratae and the RCMP would issue a public statement explaining the situation to Canadians. This is what we called the “unilateral option”.

In order to address Canada's serious public safety concerns, our objective, as I said before, was the accountability option. During the meeting, our counterpart did not refuse to look into the accountability option, but he refused to acknowledge any links and denied everything we presented. We eventually agreed to pause, keep the meeting confidential—as suggested by my counterpart—and reconvene on October 14, Thanksgiving Monday, to further discuss this. Instead, the Government of India chose to not respect our agreement and went public the next day, Sunday, October 13, again using its false narrative that Canada has not shown any evidence.

By going public, the Government of India clearly signalled it was not going to be accountable or take the actions we need it to take to ensure public safety. It then became clear to the RCMP that we had to take the unilateral option, meaning PNG the diplomats and issue a public statement. We also decided to roll out our media engagement strategy in order to seek a broader audience and maximize impact.

Deputy Minister Morrison and I spoke to The Washington Post on background in the late afternoon of Sunday, October 13. We provided non-classified information on the actions we had taken to co-operate with India, and we explained how the evidence showed that the Government of India was conducting illegal activities against Canadians, including threats to their lives.

The Government of India has, from the beginning, accused Canada of engaging in a politically motivated investigation and using the Canadian media to further this. This is clearly not the case. However, we were prepared for this accusation to resurface. Therefore, we made a strategic decision to engage a respected international news outlet that had already published on the subject, in order to ensure that the record was straight and that our side of the story could be widely heard.

In the interest of public safety and disrupting a network fuelling violence in Canadian communities, Minister Joly declared six accredited Indian representatives personae non gratae.

India reciprocated by declaring personae non gratae six Canadian officials from our high commission in New Delhi.

This is not a decision Canada took lightly. Engaging with India is a central component of our Indo-Pacific strategy.

Our position is clear: Canada remains open to co-operation with India, but we need to have meaningful engagement from India on our grounded and serious public safety concerns.

Thank you for your time, and we are available for answers.