Well, it's easy to do, because I think the previous witness did a marvellous job of framing the issues.

I thank the chairman very much for inviting me today. May I also parenthetically thank the staff, who did an amazing job of dealing with all the logistics.

My own research is largely focused on the Sino-British negotiations arriving at the joint declaration in 1984 and the implementation prior to the British making their exit. Much of that story lies outside the scope of today's hearing, but not entirely. There are problems today that have their origins in decisions taken decades ago, and that makes them much more difficult to resolve today.

Let me quickly raise three issues.

When Britain left Hong Kong, in many ways it left a very admirable legacy. There were the obvious rights and freedoms— freedoms of speech, of assembly, of the press—and there was a bill of rights latterly enacted, and Hong Kong had an excellent judiciary. I think my colleagues on the panel in Hong Kong can speak to this more eloquently than I could.

Despite having a famously freewheeling economic system, there was at the time an effective regulatory system and an expectation that corruption, once detected, would be rooted out. And the city had an exemplary civil service.

In sum, these were the attributes left behind by a liberal democracy. But I think everyone who's here today understands profoundly that for these rights and these freedoms and expectations to endure and be refined over time, there has to be a governing body that believes in these freedoms and that guarantees and sustains them.

This is what Britain was unable to leave behind. They were unable to leave democratic institutions that might accomplish this. Constitutional development before handover was very tentative and was very shallowly rooted, and it has been difficult for such institutions as had been developed to flourish and deepen ever since the handover.

The reasons for this are complex, but essentially Britain started very late, the people of Hong Kong who were interested in governance at the time were divided, and China was the recalcitrant partner. China in those days accepted Hong Kong as it was, not as it might be, and they resisted democratic development. There hadn't been democratic development before, and they resisted its development later.

The solution, as a result, was to go slow, to maintain something of a hybrid that allowed for appointed legislators, indirectly elected legislators, and directly elected legislators, with the ratio of each changing over time in favour of directly elected legislators. In British times, this was referred to as convergence, as the through train, as the low solution, but in effect democracy would come. But when it might come was never fully stipulated, and that leads us to the problem today. Gradualism was the solution arrived at between China and Britain.

The problem with gradualism is that the end game must arrive, at some point. The people of Hong Kong have been waiting for a satisfactory, permanent, and truly representative form of government not just since handover, but indeed since 1984, when the first indirect elections were held in Hong Kong. The idea of attenuating the democratic process of slowly doling out reforms and waiting for China to accept and acknowledge Hong Kong's loyalty to China, albeit in Hong Kong's own fashion, has been going on for more than 30 years.

Even now the iterative process goes on. Whatever is decided in 2017 will not put Hong Kong's aspirations to preserve and protect its autonomy to rest. Time and again you see parties and organizations and think tanks, such as the Hong Kong Democratic Foundation, wrestling with this iterative process, offering compromise and fresh ideas and notions, but the process is very slow and very dispiriting. This is why you end up having, as a previous witness said, the frustrations, the Occupy movement, this restiveness.

And what you have is a legislature that is only partly democratic. In fact, the people are electing the opposition rather than the government. The legislature, as a result, cannot effectively debate and influence policies put before them by the government.

Furthermore, with the chief executive selected by indirect means and vetted by China, there remains the sense in Hong Kong that there is no one protecting the city's autonomy, no advocate for the city's interest, and no opportunity to influence their own destiny. How, then, are the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the joint declaration to be sustained? And how does Hong Kong maintain its special character apart from China but within China without that advocacy and wisdom coming from within Hong Kong? This is the real dilemma that is faced in Hong Kong today.

This brings me to my second point, which is one on which the previous witness gave a beautiful explanation. The China of today is not the China that negotiated the joint declaration. I'm not here to burnish Deng Xiaoping's image. He was certainly no democrat, but he did not want to inherit a truculent population. He did not want to see the city's resources and sophistication dissipated, so he accepted considerable risks. Most important, he was unafraid of Hong Kong's separateness. It was enough that he had reunited an errant territory to the motherland, and he did not seek to make Hong Kong like any other Chinese city, and that's what's different today. The China of today does not see Hong Kong as Deng saw it. Often it is said that Hong Kong cannot have further democratic development because, first, it might spin out of China's control, and, second, because it would be a vanguard and further the interest in the rest of China for democratic development.

China doesn't have to favour Hong Kong's tycoons any more because it has tycoons of its own. China doesn't have to respect Hong Kong's educational system. It can blend into that system as in the university system. They have Shanghai to rival Hong Kong now, though in many ways Shanghai is not like Hong Kong.

In essence, the China of today, unlike the 1980s and 1990s and immediately after the handover, does want Hong Kong to be more like any other Chinese city, and it is not enthralled with Hong Kong's special character. This is new and it is especially dispiriting to all Hong Kong, not just to democratic activists.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would make the point that very recently a Chinese official in London argued that the joint declaration is an anachronism that has no utility, and it was relevant to the period prior to handover and has no meaning now.

Allowing that times change, this position is nonetheless untrue and it is sad to hear. It is sadder still that Britain had such a muted reaction to it. The joint declaration is a treaty, signed and ratified by the British Parliament and by the National People's Congress. It is registered as a formal treaty at the United Nations. The sun does not set on the treaty until 2047, and as Deng said, its relevance carries on thereafter.

More to the point, it is a document that affirms China's commitment to Hong Kong's way of life, its values, and its freedoms, and it stipulates Hong Kong's autonomy. If China can vitiate the treaty unilaterally because it is inconvenient or because it wishes to reinterpret its commitments, then what value have treaties and agreements negotiated henceforth? What meaning would a treaty have for the South China Sea or the East China Sea should it ever materialize? What certainty would a trade agreement consummated under the WTO guidelines have if such agreements could be undone when the terms seem onerous or inconvenient to China?

I close by saying I'm pleased that you were here today and the other day exploring these issues, even if they are left over from history. Also, I appreciate that Hong Kong's special consideration, special situation, is considered by all countries like Canada and the United States, which, when asked by Britain and China in 1984, easily and comfortably celebrated the terms of the joint declaration.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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