Thank you, Cesar.

Thank you for having us today.

Members of the committee, in recent years Canada has exported large volumes of Canadian-made L3Harris Wescam surveillance and target acquisition sensors to Turkey for use by the Turkish military. These sensors are primarily attached to the underside of aircraft, including drones, and are used to surveil potential targets on the ground. However, they should not be mistaken for mere cameras. The variant of Canadian-made sensors exported to Turkey, the Wescam MX-15D, is also fitted with a laser designator. This component directs munitions toward their targets and is vital to launching modern air strikes.

The majority of Canadian-made sensors exported to Turkey are used on the Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drone and have seen extensive use in combat across several conflict zones. Turkey has also provided them to allied actors in Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey's provision of Wescam sensors to its allies is a textbook example of diversion, which is the illicit transfer of weapons systems to unauthorized users. The case of Canadian weapons being diverted to the conflict in Libya is particularly troublesome, as this also constitutes a breach of the almost decade-old UN arms embargo against that country.

Diversion is prohibited under the Arms Trade Treaty, to which Canada is a party. As such, the Government of Canada is obligated under international law to stem the illicit diversion of weapons systems. This would indisputably apply to the case of Turkey. Whereas Canada's temporary suspension of arms exports to Turkey is a step in the right direction, the move is long overdue. According to a UN report published last year, since at least May 2019 Turkey has been diverting drones to Libya, including the Bayraktar TB2, which is invariably equipped with Canadian-made Wescam sensors. These findings alone should have made clear the substantial risk associated with these arms exports.

Given Turkey's brazen behaviour in Libya, it should have come as no surprise to Global Affairs Canada that the same Canadian weapons would also be found illicitly fuelling the war in Nagorno-Karabakh. By all accounts, Turkey's provision of weapons to Azerbaijan substantially influenced the outcome of that conflict.

To satisfy its obligations under international law, the Government of Canada should move to fully cease the further export of such weapon systems to Turkey, or run the risk of non-compliance with the international arms control frameworks it has voluntarily acceded to.

Thank you.

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