Governments that are considering controls must weigh strategic, political, economic, technological, cultural and moral or ethical concerns, and in many cases these do not easily line up together. On the surface, these are never easy decisions.

However, for Canadian governments, these are not as difficult as they appear. In fact, in some ways, Canadian military and dual-use export controls are not really of its own making. As a function of long-standing principles underlying Canadian foreign policy, one might actually suggest that others make the decisions, or at least set the basic parameters of Canadian decisions in which Canada fills, in the details or the blanks.

For Canada, its export controls are informed by UN Security Council sanction regimes, a host of international and multilateral agreements, and a set of common preferences and interests that are shared by like-minded nations, Canada’s NATO allies and the United States in particular. The latter is, of course, extremely important. Canada’s defence and dual-use technology and production capabilities are integrated into what may be termed the North American defence industrial and technological base, and as component and subsystem suppliers within American complicated corporate structures and supply chains, a significant portion of Canadian goods are subject to the U.S. international traffic in arms regulations.

Naturally, difficulties arise if all these forces are not aligned together. This is especially the case when differences emerge between Canada’s NATO European allies and the United States.

Even so, Canada cannot, and arguably should not, be out of step with the international community, allies and the U.S., except on the political margins. This is especially relevant in the recent decisions to suspend new export permits to Turkey and subsequently prohibit export permits. At one level, this was a made-in-Canada solution on the legal grounds that Turkey had violated, to some degree, the end-user prohibition, in response to evidence that Canadian surveillance technology embedded in Turkish drones had been provided to Azerbaijan and then employed in the recent war over Nagorno-Karabakh. Canada cannot sit idly by when a legal agreement is violated, and, from this perspective, the Canadian decision should not be interpreted as expressing any position on the conflict or any other aspect of Turkish behaviour.

At the same time, it is not difficult to interpret the decision as more political than legal. In this regard, Canada is in step with its European allies and the United States, albeit perhaps a step or two ahead.

Concerns about Turkish behaviour long predate this violation. For example, the EU and NATO allies have expressed a range of concerns about Turkish internal and external behaviour, and talks have begun between the EU and NATO on possible coordinated prohibitions on military and dual-use exports. The U.S. is entertaining similar prohibitions and has frozen F-35 sales to Turkey.

Of course, while Canadian, American and EU motives share some general similarity, they are also distinctly different. The difficulty for all concerned is Turkey’s status as a key geostrategic member of the alliance, the implications of coordinated allied military and dual-use export controls on Turkish membership, and in particular its importance relative to NATO deterrence activities on the southern flank and in the Black Sea. It also has implications for peace and stability in south Europe and the Aegean Sea.

The central issue with regard to Turkey is the clash between the legal in-area commitments of alliance members, as embodied in articles 3, 5 and 6 of the Treaty of Washington, and national out-of-area interests.

In particular, I would note that article 3 states:

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Turkey has distinctly different interests in the Middle East that are not entirely shared by the rest of the alliance. Balancing these differences is not an easy task, but it's clear that a Turkey within the alliance is more preferable to a Turkey outside of the alliance. I suspect that this view is also held by the Turkish government.

In this regard, Canada’s prohibition of defence exports is not going to drive Turkey over the edge. Canada is simply not that important, nor is Turkey dependent on Canadian defence exports. The same cannot be said for the United States and other NATO allies, which could push Turkey over the edge if widespread prohibitions are undertaken. However, this is unlikely. What is important for Canada is to negotiate a quick resolution with the Turkish government, which would positively contribute to managing this intra-alliance issue.

I look forward to answering any of your questions on the Turkish issue, or broader issues concerning military and dual use export controls.

Thank you.

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