Good morning.

A 1998 U.S. war game was stopped when the red team, Russia, facing catastrophic defeat, launched a coordinated nuclear strike against space assets. Space, for all intents and purposes, was functionally destroyed. As a result, the U.S. blue team military forces, dependent upon space, ground to a halt. It was further estimated that the attack would have resulted in an estimated 20-year global recession. The results would subsequently inform the congressionally mandated commission on space study, the Rumsfeld report, which warned of a future Pearl Harbor in space.

The probability of such an attack is relatively low, even in the case of a major war between the great powers of space-dependent states. Even so, the likelihood that limited strikes against space assets, whether in an attempt to disrupt or degrade electronic signals or to physically strike satellites, is relatively high. At the same time, the ability to defend space-based capabilities for national defence and economic reasons is extremely difficult but essential.

In no particular order, there are numerous answers and options available for the defence of access to space. The first, ironically, is not to defend per se, but to deter, which in turn can be assessed in two basic forms. One is existential in nature. Assuming that all states to a conflict are dependent upon space capabilities, all will be deterred from striking space capabilities. Common interests here set the foundation for an expansion of the existing space legal regime, centred on the outer space treaty. Problematic, however, is the fear of defection and cheating.

This fear underpins the other deterrence option, which implicitly coexists with the first. This is the threat to retaliate against an adversary who attacks our space capabilities by explicitly threatening their own space capabilities or other high-value assets.

Even with these in place, a state has incentives to develop capabilities as insurance against deterrence failure. Among these are redundancy and reconstitution. The former entails non-space backup systems capable of mitigating against the loss of space capabilities. The latter is the possession of a strategic reserve of space capabilities—satellites—that can be rapidly launched to replace lost capabilities.

With regard to satellite on-orbit measures, the first step is space domain awareness. Here the problem is not knowing what is on-orbit per se, but what the purpose is. Civil and commercial space capabilities are relatively easy to discern, as are many military dedicated satellites. However, satellites, which are nationally flagged, may possess other functions that may be dormant, and, as with national civil air and maritime assets, can be mobilized during a time of crisis or war. This is the dual-use problem, in which military space capabilities and employment are much greater than the sum of dedicated military space capabilities. This reality provides on-orbit redundancy in which satellites can perform different functions, including replacing a destroyed satellite, although it also complicates significantly understanding intent and purpose.

It is also useful to differentiate among threats to space capabilities. The first is directly to the ground stations. The second is to electronic signals transmitted to and from satellites. Satellite signals are encrypted, although the extent to which existing encryption is sufficient to protect against disruption or degradation varies widely. Here resides the space version of the cybersecurity problem. As with this problem on earth, the problem of attribution and intent of electronic or cyber-attacks on satellites exists, even in peacetime.

All satellites are hardened to some degree to protect against the harsh environment of space. Hardening, however, beyond environmental protection to include defence against a nuclear strike is extremely costly relative to launch weight and the tight economic margins of commercial space, at least for now.

The second is direct threats to satellites and the capacity to manoeuvre out of harm's way, which has grown immensely over the last decades. However, this option is a double-edged sword. The capability to manoeuvre also enables the employment of a satellite as an anti-satellite weapon. The same applies to emerging on-orbit servicing satellites with robotic arms, of which the Canadarm on the space shuttle was the first example.

Canada, in terms of space defence, sits on the margins, notwithstanding a comparatively small but advanced space technology industry. Importantly, given the dual-use nature of, for example, the RADARSAT Constellation and planned military space investments identified around NORAD modernization, space defence must be carefully assessed alone and in conjunction with allies.

I look forward to your questions.