Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I echo some of the remarks that Professor Ostwald also made, and I will focus my five minutes on three sets of points.

First, why should Canada care about ASEAN and Southeast Asia? First and foremost, ASEAN serves regional stability. Within Southeast Asia, ASEAN helps to stabilize once-contentious bilateral relations and also, in the broader regions, ASEAN platforms, despite challenges, offer increasingly rare neutral arenas for informal and formal exchange among states, including those with challenged relations.

Further, given heightened U.S.-China competition, ASEAN continues to offer its member platforms for omni-engagement, which serves states' desires to not choose one power over another and to deny any one the ability to make Southeast Asia its exclusive sphere of influence. Engaging a range of major and middle powers also means diversified partners, which supports states' interests and strategic autonomy.

I think, for outside actors like Canada, ASEAN is additionally valuable because having ASEAN support lends legitimacy to one's initiative and regional order priorities.

Then, finally, Southeast Asian economies are part of larger regional economic networks, including, most notably, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which is based on ASEAN's free trade agreements with dialogue partners.

Second, what are the challenges Canada should be cognizant of? I emphasize three. For one, ASEAN is an intergovernmental organization, as was noted, of 10 states of varied sizes, levels of development and global relations, that operate on consensus. These inter-ASEAN differences are not eased by current conflicts. Similarly, the omni-engagement that typifies ASEAN's larger frameworks means a diversity of partner interests as well. Certainly, ASEAN initiatives are often less decisive than some actors would like, so we also need to be realistic about ASEAN's limits.

Another consideration is specific to Canada. Canada's renewed attention to Southeast Asia in ASEAN takes place against the context of its relative absence. Despite its earlier remarkable engagement, regional states are aware of the fact that Canada is nearly the last of ASEAN's dialogue partners to seek a strategic partnership. The value of strategic partnership does offer an important signal, even if belated, of Canada's commitment. It also offers a forward-looking framework by which to regularize and expand relations. This said, what the partnership means in practice remains to be seen, and ASEAN and Canada will have a role to play in this, but in practice ASEAN's strategic partnerships offer ASEAN partners considerable room for initiatives, so there's definitely opportunity here for Canada if it wants to take it.

The timing of Canada's renewed interest, however, does raise the question of, “Why now?” This leads me to a third consideration and concern. I think it's important not to make Canada's engagement of ASEAN purely a function of its China or U.S. policy. To do so plays to Southeast Asian questions about the content and durability of Canada's commitment. More importantly, it misunderstands some of the predominant regional thinking among its member states. Despite their diversity, ASEAN states tend to share three points of agreement. One is that domestic economic security matters most. Two, China's a geographic and economic reality for those residing in Asia. For all Southeast Asian states, China is a critical economic partner, especially in trade but also in other areas, and geographically also China is a permanent resident power, and this means, strategically and economically, the priority is co-existence, even among those most concerned about China. Finally, there is a common concern for national and strategic autonomy. For Southeast Asian states this means it's best not to rely on any one country, whether it is China or the United States. If Canada or any partner is to be relevant in Southeast Asia, policy has to be cognizant of the three points I just mentioned.

This now leads me to my third point: Where are the opportunities? I emphasize two for Canada.

The first is that Canada is an actor that is not the United States and not China, and so that widens opportunities to carve out different kinds of options. Both United States and Chinese initiatives have become quite politicized in Southeast Asia. The engagement of other actors, like Canada, helps to generate other options and pathways that are seen as less divisive and destabilizing. This interest in alternative third ways is also evident in ASEAN's own regional initiatives. Professor Ostwald already mentioned the ASEAN outlook, but we can mention the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership as also an alternative third way in response to U.S. and Chinese initiatives.

The second opportunity for Canada is in trade leadership, and this is all the more important now, given uncertain U.S. trade commitments and policies as well as the priority that Southeast Asian states attach to trade as the basis for comprehensive security. Canada has opportunities to also play a leading role in trade.