Thank you, Chair, for the invitation to appear on this subject.

It's now approximately 18 months since the Indo-Pacific strategy was launched in November 2022, so it was conceived more than two years ago and a lot has happened since then, some of which will inevitably shape how it needs to be delivered. In my view, the strategy had and has two principal objectives, although thematically it's divided into five components for delivery.

The first objective is to position Canada to take advantage of and participate in the growth and strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific region, one of which, of course, is ASEAN—South Asia—which is essentially but not exclusively India and the North Pacific, Japan, Korea, Taiwan and, of course, China.

The second, albeit unstated, objective is to deal with Canada's so-called “China problem”, a problem that, if anything, grew because of the work of the foreign interference commission. Thus, in some ways, we have two strategies bolted together: One is essentially defensive and reactive in regard to China, and one is more forward-looking and positive in terms of developing closer relations with the rest of the region.

The IPS document states that our approach to China is “inseparable from our broader Indo-Pacific Strategy”. This suggests, then, that we are using the IPS and its focus on strengthening relations with the region as a key element in dealing with China.

The strategy also says, “Canada's approach is aligned with those of our partners in the region and around the world.” That statement, frankly, is a bit of a stretch, especially with regard to ASEAN, as was pointed out by the other speakers. The countries in the region—including, in particular, the ASEAN states—have their own complex interrelationships and dynamics in terms of relationships with China, and just as Canada has a different degree of co-operation and ties with individual states within the region, so too do they have their own web of interrelationships. China is a factor in all of these, especially for the individual ASEAN countries and for ASEAN as a whole. I think Canada needs to be clear that it values building relationships with regional partners as an end in itself, which could also include insurance against an increasingly unpredictable United States market, but not as a remedy to our “China problem”, and that's been one of the challenges in explaining the policy to partners in the region so far.

Now, the IPS got off to a slow start, but it had some successes, for sure, in its initial rollout. There's been a welcome increase in the presence of ministers in the region, the most recent being Minister Blair's taking part in the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore this past weekend. There have been announcements of senior appointments, the planned opening of new offices in various regional capitals and progress towards an Asia Pacific Foundation office in Singapore. The conclusion of a strategic partnership with ASEAN has been announced, and there has been an increase, of course, in our naval presence in the region.

Offsetting this has been a substantial delay in launching programs that involve non-governmental entities in Canada such as the regional engagement initiatives. Potential partners in Canada are impatiently waiting for details. I understand that RFPs for some of these programs will be released in September, which is almost two years after the announcement of the strategy.

Delay caused by the perhaps necessary bureaucratic approval process for funding and staffing is one issue. The other is the changing background since the IPS was announced. To cite a few examples, there is the crisis in our relations with India, so we have an Indo-Pacific strategy virtually without India; the evolution of AUKUS, of which Canada is not yet a member, but there is talk about some form of association; the U.S. launch of its own Indo-Pacific framework; of course, continued aggressive behaviour by China toward Taiwan and the Philippines; allegations of Chinese electoral interference in Canada; the U.S.-China tech war; China’s economic slowdown; and even, indeed, our own defence challenges.

Nothing remains static. As a result, the IPS, which was conceived back in 2021-22, cannot be static either.

Let me just point out three or four areas where I think renewed effort would be helpful.

The first would be to speed up and clarify the process for access to funding for Canadian NGOs. This would go a long way toward building institutional and people-to-people ties, but the funds need to flow.

The second is with regard to trade and trade leadership. Canada is the chair of the CPTPP process this year. There are three ASEAN states that are members. Canada, I think, has an important opportunity and role to play in providing strong leadership for the agreement's updating and for opening up and dealing with the accession process.

We should continue to push negotiations for a Canada-ASEAN FTA, building on the partnership that's been announced.

As part of this—and I know it's not related directly to ASEAN—I believe it's important to strengthen non-diplomatic ties with Taiwan, which could include a high-profile trade mission and dealing with the issue of Taiwan's and China's CPTPP membership, where there is a logjam and it's up to Canada, I think, to help move things along.

Finally, and always important, is keeping open dialogue with China, as is now being done, because, whether we like it or not, China will always play an outsized role in the region.

Ultimately, we need to present the Canadian value proposition of why Canada is important to the region and why we matter.

I'd be happy to respond to questions on those points.

Thank you.

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